Arguments For God: The Moral Argument


Definitions, Terms, And More:

This is probably one of the most convincing arguments for the existence of God and especially as a negation towards moral relativism. Now before we start the argument, let’s define a couple of important terms:

1. Moral duties: the obligation to retreat from the ‘bad’ and fulfill the ‘good’.
2. Moral values: ‘good’ and  ‘bad’.
3. Moral objectivism: moral values and duties that are independent of what people think (e.g. the Holocaust is bad, even if the Nazis succeeded in brainwashing the world to think that it wasn’t).
4. Moral relativism: moral values and duties that are dependent of what people think.
5. Moral intuition: an intuitional proposition is true because (1) it is self-evident, (2) needs no further justification, (2) and is known in full once all the facts are laid out (2+2=4 must be learned, but is justified by an appeal to intuition).

Here is the syllogism for the argument for those who like to see the logical flow:

Premise:
1.  If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
Conclusion:
1. Therefore God does exist.
With these in mind let’s begin the argument!

In Defense of Premise 1:
Many an atheist proudly affirm that objective morality exists even in the absence of God. They state that the origin of morality is derived from the evolutionary process and is grounded in our society. It’s merely an adaptation to our hostile environment – just like legs or arms. But an obvious problem arises when one claims this: morality doesn’t become objective in a naturalistic worldview, it becomes merely an illusion of the mind conditioned throughout the ages. Why? Because it was put in our minds for the sole purpose of increasing our survivability rate. Nothing else. Therefore, it becomes impossible to condemn war, oppression, racism, and sexual abuse as evil. Although, through the course of human evolutionary development, such actions have become ‘taboo’, there is no reason to believe that such actions are actually wrong. A person committing rape, for example, is simply going against the social norm and is thus on the same level as a person that belches at the dinner table or leaves the toilette seat up. The rapist is merely acting unfashionable.  Morality when coupled with evolution becomes relativistic and non-binding, not objective and obligatory.

Some radical types have retreated to a spin-off of the famous Platonic Good to explain the existence of objective morality without God. They posit that the abstract concepts of love, charity, compassion, etc. exist in their own eternal realm and act within the non-abstract realm. However, a contradiction arises from this. From their claim it follows that in the absence of people, universals like charity would still exist. Why? Because these traits allegedly exist in an independent abstract dimension. However, this statements is incoherent because charity isn’t actually charitable. Secondly, I don’t see how this abstract dimension could interact with the physical dimension. It just doesn’t make sense. But that’s besides the point. Even if the abstract could interact with the physical dimension how would we know what is ‘good’ or ‘wrong’, since the only thing these abstract ideas could do is simply describe a particular set of actions and not actually oblige us to do anything. Thus, this theory neglects to answer both the meta-physical and normative ethical questions.

In Defense Of Premise 2:

I think it’s important to remember that the burden of proof is on the one that makes claims that are different from our moral intuition. This is to say that any theory that seems to contradict our ethical intuitions needs justification.  But, this begs the question, do intuitions actually exist? The answer is yes. There are many different pathways to gaining knowledge and I think one of them is morality. I also think that with every pathway to knowledge there are certain “base beliefs”. These base beliefs range from things like self-awareness, mathematical equations, logical principles, and most importantly, basic moral laws. One might ask, “How do you know such ‘base beliefs’ exist?”. Well, Aristotle seemed to agree with me: “Some, indeed, demand to have the law proved, but this is because they lack education; for it shows lack of education not to know of what we should require proof, and of we should not. For it is quite impossible that everything should have a proof; the process would go on to infinity, so there would be no proof….” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1006a). If I always had to give justification for my beliefs, then I would have to ad infinitum. Forever. To stop this infinite regress one must appeal to the apparent: intuitions or base beliefs.

Take this conversation:
“What color is that apple?”
“Red.”
“How do you know the apple is red?”
“Because the apple is right in front of me….”
“How do you know the apple is right in front of you?”
“Because I see it….”
“How do you know you see it?”
“Because the I see the physical world and that apple is in the physical world.”
“How do you know you see the physical world?”

It seems I’m stuck. I don’t conclude that I see the physical world based upon any other evidence. The infinite regress seems apparent. We need intuitions; without them we wouldn’t be able to know anything.

So how does this prove that objective morals exist? Well I think goes like this:
(1) If objective morality does not exist, then our moral intuitions do not exist.
(2) Our moral intuitions do exist.
(C1) Therefore, objective morality exists.

We’ve already proven premise (2) of the argument above, so what about (1)? From our argument we see that if our moral intuitions suggested the objectivity morality, then we would observe that our intuitions would be things that would only make sense if morality were objective. I think that our intuitions of justice, fairness, tolerance, charity, etc. all point to objective morality because these things can’t exist in a relative world. There is no justice if nobody is wrong. There is no tolerance if you have no obligation to respect each other’s beliefs. The list goes on and on. Our base beliefs only make sense in an objective world and until proven wrong (since the burden of proof is on the opposing side) we have every reason to believe so.

In Conclusion:

We can be sure that we cannot truly be good without a law giver. On the other hand, if we do believe that moral values and duties are objective and intuitional, that provides moral grounds for believing in God.

It interests me how the alleged “New Atheists”  have rejected God as the source of moral objectivity. Richard Taylor on the subject writes, “The modern age, more or less repudiating the idea of a divine lawgiver, has nevertheless tried to retain the ideas of moral right and wrong, not noticing that, in casting God aside, they have also abolished the conditions of meaningfulness for moral right and wrong as well. Thus, even educated persons sometimes declare that such things are war, or abortion, or the violation of certain human rights, are ‘morally wrong,’ and they imagine that they have said something true and significant.Educated people do not need to be told, however, that questions such as these have never been answered outside of religion…. Contemporary writers in ethics, who blithely discourse upon moral right and wrong and moral obligation without any reference to religion, are really just weaving intellectual webs from thin air; which amounts to saying that they discourse without meaning.”

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  1. #1 by Anonymous on July 18, 2011 - 1:09 pm

    “(1) If objective morality does not exist, then our moral intuitions do not exist.
    (2) Our moral intuitions do exist.
    (C1) Therefore, objective morality exists. we have moral intuitions.”

    If our moral intuitions do not have anything to do with God, then this syllogism is a nice refutation of premise one, no?

  2. #2 by studentsforchristianity on July 19, 2011 - 12:37 am

    I don’t know where you’re going with this.

    A. – What I’m saying:
    Ex.1. If objective morality, then God.
    If moral intuitions, then objective morality.

    Ex. 2. Objective morals point to God.
    Moral intuitions point to objective morals.

    B. – What you suggest:
    Ex. 1. If God, then objective morality.
    If Moral intuitions, then objective morality.

    Ex. 2. God points to objective morals.
    Moral intuitions point to objective morals.

    There’s an obvious strawman fallacy there.

  3. #3 by Geoffrey Charles on July 19, 2011 - 2:58 am

    I’m saying that if moral intuitions don’t have anything to do with God then your argument for objective morality from moral intuitions may refute premise one of your argument from morality for the existence of God.

  4. #4 by studentsforchristianity on July 19, 2011 - 3:31 am

    I think the confusion is being caused by ambiguous terms.

    What do you mean by “moral intuitions don’t have anything to do with God…”? I’m certainly not saying that. I could simply make the argument:
    p1: If God does not exist, then moral intuitions do not exist.
    p2: Moral intuitions do exist.
    C1: Therefore, God exists.
    Forgive me if the confusion was cause by me.

  5. #5 by Geoffrey Charles on July 19, 2011 - 12:51 pm

    It seems that you’re begging the question in p1 of that new argument. You’ll have to argue for p1 rather than just assert it. Don’t you think so?

  6. #6 by studentsforchristianity on July 20, 2011 - 3:32 am

    Well, yeah, the argument needs justification, but that wasn’t my point. You were saying that I was making a logical error in my argument for objective morality. Were you not?

  7. #7 by Geoffrey Charles on July 20, 2011 - 1:04 pm

    I was saying that your argument for objective morality from moral intuitions may refute your argument for God from objective morality because perhaps moral intuition, and thus objective morality, exist yet God does not. Therefore p1 of your argument for God’s existence from objective morality would be false.

  8. #8 by studentsforchristianity on July 21, 2011 - 12:46 am

    “…perhaps moral intuition, and thus objective morality, exist yet God does not.”

    Yes, but as I made in my defense of premise (1), objective morality and thus moral intuition cannot exist independently of God. Your point hasn’t any warrant yet.

  9. #9 by Geoffrey Charles on July 21, 2011 - 12:55 am

    I don’t see anything about moral intuitions in your defense of p1. Perhaps you can show me?

  10. #10 by studentsforchristianity on July 21, 2011 - 1:06 am

    I didn’t say anything about moral intuitions directly, but if I say that objective morals exist then it logically follows that moral intuitions exist. You can see this in the defense of premise (2)

  11. #11 by Geoffrey Charles on July 21, 2011 - 1:46 am

    In your defense of p2 it seems that you’re saying moral intuitions exist based upon the necessity for base beliefs rather than because they logically follow from the existence of objective morality.

  12. #13 by Geoffrey Charles on July 21, 2011 - 2:46 am

    OK. Then I would think an argument that you’re up against is the following:

    p1 If moral intuitions exist then objective morality exists.
    p2 Moral intuitions exist.
    c1 Therefore objective morality exists.

    Key to this argument is the definition of objective morality.

  13. #14 by studentsforchristianity on July 21, 2011 - 3:02 am

    Sure, but there’s no reason to think that objective morality is the logical consequent of moral intuitions without invoking some type of God

  14. #15 by Geoffrey Charles on July 21, 2011 - 12:31 pm

    It depends on one’s definition of objective morality. By your own reasons, moral intuitions could point to “something” objective, e.g. principles of action like fairness, kindness, etc., right?

    • #16 by studentsforchristianity on July 22, 2011 - 12:49 am

      How about you define objective morality.

      “By your own reasons, moral intuitions could point to “something” objective, e.g. principles of action like fairness, kindness, etc., right?”

      Not necessarily. Our moral intuitions could be completely wrong.

      • #17 by Geoffrey Charles on July 22, 2011 - 3:51 am

        So, you don’t believe your own arguments, or… ?

  15. #18 by studentsforchristianity on July 23, 2011 - 12:54 am

    Why would you call that into question?

  16. #19 by Geoffrey Charles on July 23, 2011 - 12:32 pm

    Because you made this argument:

    “(1) If objective morality does not exist, then our moral intuitions do not exist.
    (2) Our moral intuitions do exist.
    (C1) Therefore, objective morality exists. we have moral intuitions.”

    yet you say the following:

    “there’s no reason to think that objective morality is the logical consequent of moral intuitions without invoking some type of God”

    “Our moral intuitions could be completely wrong.”

  17. #20 by studentsforchristianity on July 25, 2011 - 1:01 am

    The line of causality in my argument:
    If cold is the necessary cause of snow, then snow necessarily implies the presence of cold. However cold does not imply snow.

    If God is the necessary cause of objective morality, then objective morality necessarily implies God.

    However:
    If objective morality is the sufficient cause of moral intuition, then the presence of moral intuition implies the presence of objective morals. Another cause, however, may alternatively cause objective morality (i.e. evolutionary conditioning).

    Hope this clears things up.

    • #21 by Geoffrey Charles on July 25, 2011 - 3:40 am

      Your previous argument was different, no?

      It put objective morality as a necessary cause, not a sufficient cause, of moral intuitions.

      You said “(p1) If objective morality does not exist, then our moral intuitions do not exist.”

  18. #22 by studentsforchristianity on July 25, 2011 - 6:04 am

    My argument does not let an evolutionary foot in the door. That part is correct. However, this does not necessarily make objective morality a necessary cause.

    To make it clearer I’ll refine my argument for objective morality:

    If objective morality does not exist, then our moral intuitions are not warranted
    Our moral intuitions are warranted.
    Therefore objective morality exists.

    This allows for other explanations. However, these alternative explanations are unwarranted and baseless.

  19. #23 by Geoffrey Charles on July 25, 2011 - 10:52 am

    Yes, now it is logical 🙂

    If God does not exist, then objective morality doesn’t exist
    If objective morality doesn’t exist, then our moral intuitions aren’t warranted.
    Our moral intuitions are warranted.
    Therefore, objective morality exists.
    Therefore, God exists.

    • #24 by Geoffrey Charles on July 25, 2011 - 11:06 am

      Or, rather than logical, it’s now potentially more sound.

      Not sure if it actually is sound, though.

  20. #25 by Geoffrey Charles on July 25, 2011 - 11:34 am

    I think it comes down to your definition of objective morality, and whether or not it’s question-begging. If so, then the argument is fallacious. If not, then it comes down to whether or not p1 and, thus the conclusion of God’s existence, are necessary. Either way objective morality would potentially exist.

  21. #26 by studentsforchristianity on July 26, 2011 - 5:36 am

    Well the argument is complete, valid, consistent, and, unless proven otherwise, sound.

    I see no reason to doubt it.

  22. #27 by Geoffrey Charles on July 26, 2011 - 12:50 pm

    “Moral duties: the obligation to retreat from the ‘bad’ and fulfill the ‘good’.”

    Obligated by whom?

  23. #29 by Geoffrey Charles on July 27, 2011 - 12:30 am

    This invalidates your argument via begging the question, right?

    “p2 – objective morals and duties (i.e. obligations by God) do exist”

  24. #30 by studentsforchristianity on July 27, 2011 - 3:28 am

    p1. If God does not exist, then objective morals and duties do not exist.
    p2. Objective morals and duties do exist.
    c1. Therefore God does exist.
    c2. Therefore moral duties come from God.

    It isn’t question begging because (p2) is an ontological claim; while (c2) is making an epistemological claim. The distinction is very important.

    • #31 by Geoffrey Charles on July 29, 2011 - 8:44 pm

      “c2. Therefore moral duties come from God.”

      Haven’t you already implicitly said this in p1 ?

      • #32 by studentsforchristianity on July 29, 2011 - 11:34 pm

        I wouldn’t say implicitly.

        (p1) is just saying that objective moral duties exist necessarily from God. However, it does not explain how we know about these duties (stated in c2).

  25. #33 by Geoffrey Charles on July 28, 2011 - 11:04 pm

    OK. If I understand you correctly, you’re concluding that God obligates objective morals and duties, rather than asserting it a priori.

    So, this seems to necessitate a change in your starting definition of objective morals and duties from obligations by God to… something else, right?

  26. #34 by studentsforchristianity on July 29, 2011 - 12:08 am

    God, I think, obligates objective moral duties through a priori justification.

  27. #35 by Geoffrey Charles on July 29, 2011 - 12:44 am

    Then aren’t you, by extension, positing a priori the existence of God?

  28. #38 by studentsforchristianity on July 29, 2011 - 11:47 pm

    When I read my reply to “Then aren’t you, by extension, positing a priori the existence of God?”, I asked, “Why the heck did I say “yes”?

    I didn’t mean to say “yes” because that doesn’t make any sense at all. It would render my argument useless.

    The moral argument for God is not a priori, but a posteriori. The conclusion of my argument is based upon knowledge that is arrived from both reason and empirical evidence that is found in my premises.

    • #39 by Geoffrey Charles on July 30, 2011 - 12:36 am

      According to my understanding of your argument, your reply of “yes,” though it rendered your argument useless, was the correct reply.

      If the argument is to remain, then it seems you must redefine objective morality so as not to end up begging the question once again.

  29. #41 by Geoffrey Charles on July 30, 2011 - 12:41 am

    So, I would ask again:

    “Moral duties: the obligation to retreat from the ‘bad’ and fulfill the ‘good’.”

    Obligated by whom?

  30. #42 by Geoffrey Charles on July 30, 2011 - 1:56 am

    I tried to show you in comments #27 through #30, and #33 through #37 that your definition of objective morals and duties ultimately is an a priori declaration of the existence of God. If you read those comments again, it will show you the line of reasoning I would take (and, I actually started to take in comment #41) to illustrate that your argument is question begging.

    To clarify further:

    (p2) – Objective moral values and duties do exist.

    What are “objective moral values and duties?”

    If the answer is “obligations by God,” then you’re begging the question.

    So, by whom are we obligated to objective morals and duties?

    I hope this helps.

    • #43 by studentsforchristianity on July 30, 2011 - 2:49 am

      “What are objective moral values and duties?” is a completely different question than “Whom are we obligated by?”.

      What are objective moral values and duties? They’re something that we ought to do even when we don’t believe we have to. Who are we obligated by? We are obligated by God.

      The distinction being made, I don’t see how this is question begging.

      • #44 by Geoffrey Charles on July 30, 2011 - 12:05 am

        Different questions, yes, but they both are trying to clarify your working-definition of “objective morality.”

        Given the definitions you’ve provided, would it be fair to reword (p2) like either of the following:

        “[Obligations by God to retreat from the ‘bad’ and fulfill the ‘good’] exist.”

        or:

        “[Things from God that we ought to do even when we don’t believe we have to] exist.”

        ?

  31. #45 by studentsforchristianity on July 30, 2011 - 9:50 am

    My argument for the existence of God has nothing to do with moral epistemology though.

    “[Obligations by God to retreat from the ‘bad’ and fulfill the ‘good’] exist.”

    I would take out the “by God” since this has to do with moral epistemology and not moral ontology. It’s unnecessary to put it in there.

    • #46 by Geoffrey Charles on July 31, 2011 - 1:44 pm

      I think including such words as “obligation” and “binding” (as in your defense) also beg the question. Perhaps those words should be removed, as well? On the other hand, I may be willing to work with it 🙂

      Secondly, perhaps you’re posing a false dilemma in your defense of premise one, because to argue against (your understanding of) an evolutionary account of morality doesn’t provide positive support for the claim of p1.

      Thirdly, perhaps you’ve misunderstood an argument for objective morality from evolution, because if morality was produced by evolution, then morality is not necessarily based upon what people think. Therefore, such morality would not necessarily be subjective.

  32. #47 by studentsforchristianity on July 31, 2011 - 4:58 pm

    Explain how you think that moral “obligation” and morally “binding” are question begging.

    Forgive me if I’m wrong on this, but p1 is a negative premise and thus can be justified by a negative proof.

    If morality isn’t what people think, then what is it? Is it genetic? If so, a simple mutation in this “morality gene” might produce a completely different “morality”. How could we justify that this “morality gene” is “wrong”? What is justice if morality is based upon genetics?

  33. #48 by Geoffrey Charles on August 1, 2011 - 11:35 am

    Perhaps it’s the anthropomorphic nature of morality that makes me think those words are question begging. I’ll get back to you on that.

    In p1 you imply the positive assertion that God is the necessary cause of objective morality. Therefore, this needs positive justification, right?

    You ask good questions about evolution and morality. I don’t know the answers. However, I think my point still stands, i.e. such morality is not necessarily relative (according to your definition, i.e. subjective)

  34. #49 by studentsforchristianity on August 5, 2011 - 10:17 am

    “In p1 you imply the positive assertion that God is the necessary cause of objective morality. Therefore, this needs positive justification, right?”

    The argument has nothing to do with implications. (p1) is a negative premise, therefore it can be justified by negative proof.

    A helpful example:
    If cancer is absent, then no cancer brain cells would be present.
    Cancer brain cells are present.
    Therefore, cancer is present.

    Justification for p1 could obviously be negative.

    “You ask good questions about evolution and morality. I don’t know the answers. However, I think my point still stands, i.e. such morality is not necessarily relative (according to your definition, i.e. subjective)”

    Could you elaborate a bit on that?

  35. #50 by Geoffrey Charles on August 5, 2011 - 11:12 am

    “The argument has nothing to do with implications.”

    I disagree, and your example is a tautology. If your argument for God is tautologous, then it begs the question.

    I could be wrong, but perhaps (p1) is making a positive epistemological claim.

    To illustrate:
    (p1) If the Flying Spaghetti Monster doesn’t exist, then objective morality doesn’t exist. – Wouldn’t you say this needs positive justification for the implication that objective morality is necessarily caused by the Flying Spaghetti Monster?

    “Could you elaborate a bit on that?”

    I have many unanswered questions about morality. At times, I am not even sure how to define morality. As regards your argument however, I don’t see that you’ve established, though not for lack of trying, that evolutionary morality is not objective, i.e. not based upon what people think. Therefore, your argument is still potentially defeasible by an argument for objective morality from evolution.

  36. #51 by studentsforchristianity on August 5, 2011 - 11:54 am

    Maybe the term “negative proof” is extremely ambiguous.

    (P1) is justified through proof by contradiction.

    A common example of proof by contradiction:
    On a certain island, each inhabitant always lies or always tells the truth. Calvin and Phoebe live on the island.

    Calvin says: “Exactly one of us is lying.”

    Phoebe says: “Calvin is telling the truth.”

    Determine who is telling the truth and who is lying.

    Suppose Calvin is a truth teller. Then “Exactly one of us is lying” is true, and since Calvin is a truth teller, Phoebe is a liar. Therefore, “Calvin is telling the truth” is a lie, so Calvin must be lying. This is a contradiction, because I assumed he was telling the truth.

    Hence, I’ve proved by contradiction that Calvin must be a liar. Hence, “Exactly one of us is lying” is false. This gives two possibilities: Either both are telling the truth, or both are lying.

    Suppose both are telling the truth. This contradicts the established fact that Calvin is lying.

    The only other possibility is that both are lying. Then Calvin’s statement “Exactly one of us is lying” should be false (and it is), and Phoebe’s statement “Calvin is telling the truth” should be false (and it is). Thus, this is the only possibility, and it’s consistent with the given statements.

    • #52 by Geoffrey Charles on August 5, 2011 - 12:11 pm

      I understand the example, but I don’t understand how it relates to your argument. Nor do I understand how it wouldn’t relate to my (p1) about the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

      Care to elaborate?

      • #53 by studentsforchristianity on August 5, 2011 - 12:55 pm

        The above example was merely meant to illustrate indirect reasoning. That’s about it.

        I’ll show you how it relates to the discussion:
        Premise ¬A for X necessarily implies B, C, or D ⇒ X. However, B, C, or D contradict X.
        Therefore A ⇒X.

  37. #54 by Geoffrey Charles on August 5, 2011 - 1:10 pm

    Sorry, but I don’t follow which variables correspond to the claims and implications of your argument.

    Perhaps you could more explicitly relate them? And, how does this not also apply to my (p1) about the Flying Spaghetti Monster?

  38. #55 by studentsforchristianity on August 5, 2011 - 1:33 pm

    Premise ¬God as the cause for objective morality necessarily implies [fill in ethical theories] as the cause for objective morality.
    However, [fill in ethical theories] contradict objective morality.
    Therefore God necessarily implies objective morality.

    Are there any discrepencies between FSM and God?

    • #56 by Geoffrey Charles on August 6, 2011 - 6:13 pm

      Are the [ethical theories] in the first mention different than those in the second mention? I’m confused.

      “Are there any discrepencies between FSM and God?”

      Yes, including his immaterial, noodly appendages.

      • #57 by studentsforchristianity on August 7, 2011 - 11:32 am

        “Are the [ethical theories] in the first mention different than those in the second mention? I’m confused”
        No.

        “Yes, including his immaterial, noodly appendages.”
        How can FSM have immaterial appendages? Since an appendage is something that is in spatial relation to something else thus making it material — not immaterial.

  39. #58 by Geoffrey Charles on August 7, 2011 - 11:49 am

    “No.”

    What is this, twenty questions? 🙂

    “How can FSM have immaterial appendages?”

    They’re spiritual, supernatural appendages. Earthly spaghetti is a shadow of the heavenly Spaghetti.

    The laws of the universe, within which evolution happens, which could have produced what we call morality, are not subjective. Therefore, what we call morality would be based upon the objective laws of the universe.

    • #59 by studentsforchristianity on August 7, 2011 - 10:02 pm

      What is this, twenty questions?

      Hahaha, I didn’t mean to be so blunt, but I was short on time. To make it more clear:

      Premise ¬God as the cause for objective morality necessarily implies [fill in ethical theories. Let’s say “Theory X”] as the cause for objective morality.
      However, Theory X contradicts objective morality.
      Therefore God necessarily implies objective morality.

      “They’re spiritual, supernatural appendages. Earthly spaghetti is a shadow of the heavenly Spaghetti.”

      If this is the only major difference between God and FSM (one has “noodle” like appendages and the other doesn’t) FSM is just a rather odd rendition of the idea of God. On top of this, if this is the only difference, there doesn’t seem to be a major conflict between the two ideas.

      “The laws of the universe, within which evolution happens, which could have produced what we call morality, are not subjective. Therefore, what we call morality would be based upon the objective laws of the universe”

      The laws themselves might be immutable, but the outcomes of these biological evolutionary laws (like natural selection) would not be. Therefore, if we rewind the evolutionary clock we might find ourselves in a world in which murder and rape is the moral thing to do.

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